In this work we study the effect of rounds of interaction on the common randomness generation (CRG) problem. In the CRG problem, two parties, Alice and Bob, receive samples X i and Y i , respectively, where (X i , Y i ) are drawn jointly from a source distribution µ. The two parties wish to agree on a common random key consisting of many bits of randomness, by exchanging messages that depend on each party's respective input and the previous messages. In this work we study the amortized version of the problem, i.e., the number of bits of communication needed per random bit output by Alice and Bob, in the limit as the number of bits generated tends to infinity. The amortized version of the CRG problem has been extensively studied in the information theory literature, though very little was known about the effect of interaction on this problem. Recently Bafna et al. (SODA 2019) considered the non-amortized version of the problem (so here the goal of the interaction is to generate a fixed number of random bits): they gave a family of sources µ r,n parameterized by r, n ∈ N, such that with r + 2 rounds of communication one can generate n bits of common randomness with this source with O(r log n) communication, whereas with roughly r/2 rounds the communication complexity is Ω(n/ poly log n). Note in particular that their source is designed with the target number of bits in mind and hence the result does not apply to the amortized setting.
: Common randomness generation.
Introduction
In this paper we study the problem of common randomness generation (CRG) and the companion problem of secret key generation (SKG). In each of these problems, there are two parties Alice and Bob, who are given several samples of correlated randomness: Alice is given random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . ., and Bob is given random variables Y 1 , Y 2 , . . ., where the pairs (X i , Y i ) are distributed i.i.d. according to some distribution µ. In the CRG problem (Figure 1 ), the goal of Alice and Bob is to agree, with high probability, on some shared key K of high entropy by communicating as little as possible. In the SKG problem, they have the additional secrecy requirement that an eavesdropper Eve who observes their transcript of communication cannot determine much information on K.
The problems of CRG and SKG were introduced independently by Maurer [Mau91, Mau92, Mau93] and by Ahlswede and Csiszár [AC93, AC98] . An important motivation for their work was from cryptography, where the posession of a shared secret key allows parties to securely transmit information using a private-key cryptosystem. Rather than generating private keys based on computational hardness assumptions, as in [DH76, RSA78] , these works suggested the study of secret key generation from an information-theoretic viewpoint, under information-theoretic assumptions such as access to a correlated source. Subsequently techniques similar to those developed in [Mau93, AC93] , such as privacy amplification, have been used in work on quantum key agreement [BBB + 92, HAD + 95]. Shared common randomness, and the generation thereof, has also found additional applications in identification capacity [AD89b, AD89a] , communication complexity [CGMS17, GKS15, GS17, BGI14] , locality-sensitive hashing, [GJ18] and coding theory [BBT60, CN91] .
The initial introduction of CRG and SKG by Maurer, Ahlswede, and Csiszár was in the amortized setting, which has since been studied in many works (such as [CN00, CN04, ZC11, Tya13, LCV15, Liu16, LCV17, Ye05, GA10a, GA10b]). In this setting, given a source of correlation µ, the goal is to characterize the "achievability region", i.e., those pairs (C, L) of non-negative real numbers, such that if Alice and Bob receive N i.i.d. copies of the inputs (X, Y ) ∼ µ, by communicating roughly C · N bits, they can generate nearly L · N bits of common randomness (or secret key) with probability approaching 1 as N → ∞; a formal definition is presented in Definitions 2.1 and 2.2.
In the theoretical computer science community the non-amortized setting of CRG has also been extensively studied. In this setting, Alice and Bob still receive some number N of i.i.d. samples from the source µ, but the communication and key length do not have to grow linearly with the number of samples, and the probability of agreeing on a key need not approach 1. This problem was first studied in its zero-communication variant, where it is also known as non-interactive correlation distillation, and in the setting where Alice and Bob wish only to agree on a single bit, by Gacs and Körner [GK73] and Witsenhausen [Wit75] , as well as later works [MO05, MOR + 06, Yan07]. Bogdanov and Mossel [BM11] and Chan et al. [CMN14] study the version where Alice and Bob wish to agree on many bits, again in the zero-communication setting. Finally, several more recent works [CGMS17, GR16, GJ18] have studied the non-amortized version of CRG where communication is allowed. These latter works generally study relatively simple sources, such as the bivariate Gaussian source (BGS) and the binary symmetric source (BSS). 1 
Overview of main results: does interaction help?
Despite the large amount of work on CRG and SKG in the last several decades, until recently, very little was known about the role of interaction in these problems. While initial work in the area [AC93, AC98] studied only 1-round and 2-round protocols, recent works [LCV15, Liu16, LCV17] have generalized those initial results to multi-round protocols; however, until our work, it was not known in the amortized setting if increasing the number of rounds of some r-round protocol can actually allow the parties to communicate less (and generate random keys of the same length).
This question of whether Alice and Bob can reduce the communication cost of their protocol at the expense of increasing the number of rounds is central to our work. Curiously, for the amortized setting, the answer to this question is negative in several cases: for instance, when (X, Y ) is distributed according to the binary symmetric source (BSS) or the bivariate Gaussian source (BGS), Liu et al. [LCV17] and Tyagi [Tya13] showed that increasing the number of rounds does not help to reduce communication cost. In terms of separation results, Tyagi [Tya13] presented a source on a ternary alphabet for which a 1-round protocol has smaller communication cost than any 2-round protocol by a constant factor, and this is the only known round-based separation in the amortized setting.
Orlitsky [Orl90, Orl91] studied a slightly different version of CRG in which the key K is required to be equal to Alice's input X; thus the problem becomes that of Bob learning Alice's input. Orlitsky showed (in the non-amortized case) that 2-round protocols can require exponentially less communication than 1-round protocols. However, for any r > 2, he showed that r-round protocols can save on communication cost over 2-round protocols by at most a factor of 4. This version of the problem was also studied in the amortized case by Ma and Ishwar [MI08] , who showed that interaction does not help at all; in fact, the 1-round protocol that achieves minimum communication cost is simply given by Slepian-Wolf coding [CT12] .
The most relevant work is that of Bafna et al. [BGGS18] , who showed the following in the non-amortized setting (see [BGGS18, Theorems 1.1 & 1.2]): for any fixed r, there are sufficiently large n such that for some source µ = µ r,n , we have:
• Alice and Bob can generate secret keys of length n with r + 2 rounds of communication and O(log n) communication cost;
• When restricted to (r + 1)/2 rounds, any protocol which generates common random keys of length n must have communication cost n/ log ω(1) n.
Notice that the above result is not tight in the dependence on the number of rounds; a tight result (up to polylogarithmic factors) would state that any (r + 1)-round protocol must have communication cost n/ log ω(1) n. More significantly, the result does not establish any separation in the amortized setting, which is the main target of this paper.
Our results Our main result is an extension of the above results of Bafna et al. [BGGS18] to the amortized setting. Along the way we also get a nearly tight dependence on the number of rounds (losing a quadratic factor in communication cost and a single additional round of communication). In particular, we show:
• For the source µ = µ r,n mentioned above, any protocol with at most r rounds and which generates common random keys of length n must have communication cost at least √ n/ log ω(1) n. (See Theorem 2.2 for a formal statement.)
• Moreover, an identical rounds-communication tradeoff holds for the amortized case. (See Theorem 2.3.)
We emphasize that the second result above gives the first rounds-communication tradeoff for the amortized case (apart from the constant-factor separation between 1-round and 2-round protocols given by Tyagi [Tya13] ).
Technical Challenge At a very high level the source in [BGGS18] is built around the concept of "pointer-chasing problems" that are well-known to lead to separations in round-complexity [NW93, DGS84, PS82] . The main contribution in their work is to show how the hardness of pointer chasing (or a variation they consider) translates to the hardness of generating common randomness in their source.
Getting an amortized lower bound turns out to be significantly more challenging. For one thing we can no longer build a source that is crafted around a targeted length of the common random string. Indeed this ability allows Bafna et al. [BGGS18] to focus on the case where the two players get a single copy of the randomness (X, Y ) ∼ µ, and the core of their negative result is showing that r/2 rounds of communication are insufficient to generate any non-trivial randomness from this single copy ("non-trivial" meaning more than the number of bits communicated). In the amortized case such results are not possible: if there is a protocol with small communication and many rounds getting some amount of randomness, then we can simulate the protocol with large communication in two rounds, and then (here using the ability to amortize) we can scale back the communuication and generate proportionately less, but non-trivial amounts of randomness. Thus no matter how small the amortized communication budget is, it is always possible to get some non-trivial amounts of randomness. So our lower bounds really need to address a "direct product" version of the pointer chasing question.
Indeed, the idea of our proof is to "reduce to the non-amortized case" by using similar types of techniques that have been applied to show direct sum and direct product results for the communication complexity of functions [CSWY01, JRS03, HJMR07, BBCR13, JPY12, BR11, BRWY13]. However, the task of CRG is "more flexible" than that of computing a function as there is no prescribed output for given inputs, so implementing this reduction is nontrivial. Roughly, our results have to analyze notions such as the internal and external information complexity of all bounded round protocols (and show that these are close) whereas most of the previous use in communication complexity lower bounds only needed to work with protocols that computed a specific function. We go into further details on this in Section 2.6 after we get more specific about the sources we consider and the kind of results we seek.
Organization of this paper In Section 2 we formally introduce the problems of CRG and SKG (in both the non-amortized and amortized settings) and state our main results. Section 3 presents the proof of our main results in the non-amortized setting, and Sections 4 and 5 present the proof of our main results in the amortized setting. Section 6 collects several basic information theoretical lemmas used throughout the paper.
Background and Overview of Main Results

Notation
We first describe some of the basic notational conventions we use throughout the paper. We use capital script font, such as S, X , Y, to denote sets, and capital letters, such as X, Y, Z, to denote random variables. We typically use the letters µ, ν, D to denote distributions. S n denotes the set of all permutations on [n].
Basic probability If E ⊂ X is some event, then we will write 1[X ∈ E] to denote the random variable that is 1 if X ∈ E, and 0 otherwise. We will slightly abuse notation, e.g., if (X, Y ) ∼ ν then
] is the probability that X ∈ E when X ∼ µ. We will omit the subscript µ if the distribution is obvious. This notation extends naturally to conditional expectations.
Total variation distance & KL divergence For random variables X, Y distributed according to µ, ν, respectively, on a finite set X , ∆(µ, ν) :
| denotes the total variational distance between X and Y . For distributions µ and ν supported on a set X , the KL divergence between µ, ν, denoted KL(µ||ν), is given by, for
. We will often abuse notation when denoting KL divergences or total variation distances: for X ∼ µ, Y ∼ ν supported on a set X , we will write ∆(X, Y ) = ∆(µ, ν) and KL(X||Y ) = KL(µ||ν).
Information theory
. Now suppose (X, Y ) are random variables with X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y jointly distributed according to some distribution ν. Letting X y denote the random variable distributed as X, conditioned on Y = y, then H(X|Y = y) := H(X y ). Then the conditional entropy
If (X, Y, Z) are jointly distributed according to some distribution, then the conditional mutual information I(X; Y |Z) is given by I(X; Y |Z) := H(X|Z) − H(X|Y, Z).
Multiple random variables For random variables (X, Y ) ∼ µ distributed jointly, we will often use XY ∈ X × Y to denote the pair. The marginals X ∼ µ X , Y ∼ µ Y are the distributions on X and Y, respectively, given by P X∼µ X [X = x] := P XY ∼µ [X = x], and similarly for µ Y . Then X ⊗ Y ∈ X × Y denotes the random variable distributed according to the product of the marginals µ X ⊗µ Y . For a sequence of random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X i , . . ., for any j ≥ 1, we let X j denote the tuple (X 1 , . . . , X j ), and for 1 ≤ j ≤ j , let X j j denote the tuple (X j , X j+1 , . . . , X j ). Two common usages of this notation are as follows: (1) for N ∈ N, and a distribution Z ∼ µ, the random variable distributed according to N i.i.d. copies of µ is denoted as Z N = (Z 1 , . . . , Z N ) ∼ µ ⊗N ; (2) if Π 1 , . . . , Π t denote the first t messages in a communication protocol (see Section 2.2), then
Communication protocols
We follow the standard setup of interactive communication protocols [Yao79] , and mostly follow the notational conventions of [BBCR13, BR11] . There are finite sets X , Y, and parties Alice and Bob, who receive inputs X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y, respectively. Depending on the setting, Alice and Bob may additionally have access to private coins R A , R B , respectively, and public coins R Pub . Formally, R A , R B , R Pub may be interpreted as infinite strings of independently and uniformly distributed random bits.
An interactive r-round protocol Π consists of a sequence of r messages, Π 1 , . . . , Π r ∈ {0, 1} * that Alice and Bob alternatively send to each other, with Alice sending the first message Π 1 . The messages Π 1 , . . . , Π r are also referred to as the rounds of the protocol, and each message is a deterministic function of the previous messages, one party's input, and any randomness (public and/or private) available to that party. For 1 ≤ t ≤ r with t odd, we will write Alice's message Π t as Π t = Π t (X, R A , R Pub , Π t−1 ) if the protocol can use public and private coins (with obvious modifications if public and/or private coins are not available), and for t even, Bob's message Π t as Π t = Π t (Y, R B , R Pub , Π t−1 ). 2 The communication cost of Π, denoted by CC(Π), is the maximum of r t=1 |Π t |, taken over all inputs X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y, and all settings of the random coins R A , R B , R Pub (if applicable). The tuple consisting of all the messages, i.e., Π r = (Π 1 , . . . , Π r ), is referred to as the transcript of the protocol Π.
Rate regions for amortized CRG & SKG
Recall that in amortized CRG, Alice and Bob receive some large number N of copies (X, Y ) from the source, are allowed to communicate some number of bits that grows linearly with N , and must agree upon a key whose entropy grows linearly with N with probability tending to 1 as N → ∞. The word "amortized" refers to the fact that the communication and key entropy both grow linearly with N . The parties may use private but not public coins (as with access to public randomness, there would be no need to generate a shared random string). Definition 2.1 below follows the exposition of Liu et al. [LCV17] . Definition 2.1 (Amortized common randomness generation (CRG)). A tuple (C, L) is r-achievable for CRG for a source distribution (X, Y ) ∼ ν if for every N ∈ N, there is some N with N → 0 as 2 It is required that for each t and each instiantion of Π t−1 , the set of possible values of Πt (over all possible instantiaions of X, Y, RA, RB, RPub) must be prefix-free. This technical detail, which is introduced so that each party knows when to "start speaking" when the other finishes, will not be important for us.
N → ∞, a key set K N , and a private-coin protocol Π = Π(N ) that takes as input (X N , Y N ) ∼ ν ⊗N , such that if Π(N ) t ∈ {0, 1} * denotes the message sent in the t-th round of Π(N ), 1 ≤ t ≤ r, and
the output keys of Alice and Bob for the protocol Π(N ), then:
3. Letting K N be the random variable that is uniformly distributed on K N , then
In particular, there exists a coupling of
We denote the subset of pairs (C, L) ⊂ R 2 ≥0 that are r-achievable from the source (X, Y ) ∼ ν by T r (X, Y ); this set T r (X, Y ) is known as the achievable rate region for r-round CRG (or simply rate region, with r and the task of CRG implicit) for the source µ.
To interpret Definition 2.1, notice that C denotes the communication of the protocols Π = Π(N ), whereas L (approximately) gives the entropy of the key produced.
Corresponding to Definition 2.1 for CRG we have the following Definition 2.2 for SKG in the amortized setting:
there is some choice of a sequence N → 0 such that the following holds: for each N ∈ N there is some choice of private coin protocol 3 Π = Π(N ) such that, first, items 1 and 2 of Definition 2.1 are satisfied for these N , Π(N ), N , and, second,
As in Definition 2.1, K N denotes the random variable that is uniform on on K N ; notice that (1) above implies item 3 of Definition 2.1. We denote the set of pairs (C, L) that are r-achievable for SKG from ν by S r (X, Y ).
It is clear from the definition that r-achievability for SKG is a stronger requirement than rachievability for CRG; that is, for every source (X, Y ) ∼ ν, we have S r (X, Y ) ⊂ T r (X, Y ). It is also well-known [LCV17, Han03] that both T r (X, Y ) and S r (X, Y ) are closed subsets of R 2 .
Non-Amortized Setting
The non-amortized setting is similar to the amortized setting, in that Alice and Bob receive arbitrarily many i.i.d. samples of (X, Y ) ∼ µ, except the entropy of their key and their communication no longer grow linearly with the number of samples. Rather, the keys lie in some fixed set K, and the goal is to use as little communication (and rounds) as possible to generate a single key uniformly distributed in K. Moreover, whereas the agreement probability 1 − N in the amortized case was assumed to approach 1 asymptotically, in the non-amortized case, it is often of interest to study settings in which the parties may disagree with some probability that is bounded away from 0. In fact, this probability of disagreement may be arbitrarily close to 1. The non-amortized setting has recently received much attention among the theoretical computer science community [BM11, CGMS17, GR16, GJ18, BGGS18], where it is also known as the agreement distillation problem.
In the below definition we assume that (X, Y ) ∼ ν and ν is supported on a set X × Y.
Definition 2.3 (Non-amortized common randomness generation). For r, C ∈ N, and L, ∈ R ≥0 , we say that the tuple (C, L, ) is r-achievable from the source ν (for CRG) if there is some N ∈ N and an r-round protocol Π with private randomness that takes as input (X N , Y N ) ∼ ν ⊗N , such that at the end of Π, Alice and Bob output keys K A , K B ∈ K given by deterministic functions
3. There is a random variable K uniformly distributed on K such that
As in the amortized case, for tuples (C, L, ), observe that C denotes communication and L denotes entropy. Definition 2.3 differs slightly from the definition of achievable rates for non-amortized CRG in [BM11, CGMS17, GR16, GJ18, BGGS18], which do not limit the size of the key space K, but rather require a lower bound on the min-entropy of each of K A , K B . We present this latter definition in Appendix A (Definition A.1) and show that it is essentially equivalent to Definition 2.3.
As in the amortized setting, in the non-amortized setting secret key generation is the same as common randomness generation except the key is additionally required to be "almost independent" from the transcript of the protocol: Definition 2.4 (Non-amortized secret key generation). For r, C ∈ N and L ∈ R ≥0 , , δ ∈ [0, 1), we say that the tuple (C, L, , δ) is r-achievable from the source ν (for SKG) if the tuple (C, L, ) is r-achievable for CRG from the source ν, and if there exists a protocol Π = (Π 1 , . . . , Π r ) achieving the tuple such that
Notice that condition (2) is quite strong: it implies, for instance, that ∆(
Main Results: Analogue of Pointer-Chasing Separations for CRG & SKG
In this section we present our main results. We first state formally the main result of [BGGS18] discussed in Section 1.1, which establishes an exponential separation in communication cost between (r + 1)/2 -round protocols and (r + 2)-round protocols in the non-amortized setting:
). For each r ∈ N, ∈ [0, 1), there exists η > 0, β < ∞, n 0 ∈ N such that for any n ≥ n 0 and any ∈ N, there is a source µ r,n, such that, in the non-amortized setting:
(1) The tuple ((r + 2) log n , , 0, 0) is (r + 2)-achievable for SKG from µ r,n, (and thus ((r + 2) log n , , 0) is (r + 2)-achievable for CRG).
(2) For any L ∈ N and C ≤ min{ηL−β, n/ log β n}, the tuple (C, L, ) is not (r+1)/2 -achievable for CRG (and thus the tuple (C, L, , δ) is not (r + 1)/2 -achievable for all δ ≥ 0).
The interpretation of the parameters n, in Theorem 2.1 is described in detail in Definition 3.1 of the source µ r,n, . We remark that the proof of item (1) of the theorem is immediate once this definition is made, and so the main content of Theorem 2.1 is in the second item (i.e., the lower bound).
To aid understanding of Theorem 2.1, fix any r ∈ N, ∈ [0, 1), and consider parameters = n → ∞; the length of Alice's and Bob's inputs under µ r,n,n are O(n 2 ). The theorem gives that with only O(log n) communication, n bits of entropy can be generated in r + 2 rounds, but if we have only roughly half as many rounds (i.e., (r + 1)/2 rounds) then generating n bits of entropy takes at least n/ poly log n communication, which is exponentially larger than log n. It follows that for some r with (r + 1)/2 ≤ r < r + 2, the ratio in communication cost between the best r -round protocol and the best (r + 1)-round protocol is at least n 1/(1+ (r+1)/2 ) / log ω(1) n. Our first main result improves this ratio to n 1/4 / log ω(1) n and moreover shows that such an r lies in {r, r + 1}:
Theorem 2.2 (Tighter round dependence than Theorem 2.1; non-amortized setting). For each r ∈ N, ∈ [0, 1), there exists η > 0, β < ∞, n 0 ∈ N such that for any n ≥ n 0 and any ∈ N, the source µ r,n, of Theorem 2.1 satisfies:
(1) The tuple ((r + 2) log n , , 0, 0) is (r + 2)-achievable for SKG from µ r,n, (and thus ((r + 2) log n , , 0) is r-achievable for CRG).
(2) For any L ∈ N, C ≤ min{ηL − β, √ n/ log β n}, the tuple (C, L, ) is not r-achievable for CRG from µ r,n, (and thus for any δ ≥ 0, the tuple (C, L, , δ) is not r-achievable for SKG).
Our second main result provides an exact analogue of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 for the amortized setting: Theorem 2.3 (Amortized setting). For each r ∈ N, γ ∈ (0, 1), there is a constant c 0 > 0 such that for n ≥ c 0 , the source µ r,n, of Theorem 2.1 satisfies:
(1) The tuple ((r + 2) log n , ) is (r + 2)-achievable for SKG (and thus CRG) from µ r,n, .
(2) Set = n. For any C, L ∈ R with C ≤ n/ log c 0 n and L > γ = γn, the tuple (C, L) is not (r + 1)/2 -achievable for CRG (and thus for SKG) from µ r,n,n .
(3) Again set = n. For any C, L ∈ R with C ≤ √ n/ log c 0 n and L > γn, the tuple (C, L) is not r-achievable for CRG (and thus for SKG) from µ r,n,n .
Notice that parts (2) and (3) of Theorem 2.3 only provide a lower bound on the communication rate C for protocols when the entropy rate L is at least a constant factor times n. The problem of determining such a result for L that grow sublinearly with n, or even those L that do not grow at all (such as L = o n (1)) remains open. Such a problem boils down to showing a rounds-communication tradeoff for the r-round common random bits per interaction bit (CBIB) of the source µ r,n, , or equivalently, for the r-round strong data processing constant (SDPC) [LCV17] ; see Problem 4.7. As we discuss in Section 4.4, this problem seems to be quite difficult as a proof of it would immediately imply Theorem 2.3.
Discussion and overview of proof of Theorems 2.2 & 2.3
The source µ r,n, referred to in Theorems 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 is a variant of the well-known pointer chasing distribution from communication complexity [NW93, DGS84, PS82] . This distribution was introduced to show a similar type of rounds/communication tradeoff as in the above theorems, except for the task of computing functions rather than generating a shared string.
Alice's and Bob's inputs from µ r,n, are given as follows: for an integer n and odd r, Alice receives permutations indexed by odd integers Σ 1 , Σ 3 , . . . , Σ r : [n] → [n], and Bob receives permutations indexed by even integers Σ 2 , Σ 4 , . . . ,
. Alice and Bob also receive strings A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ {0, 1} and B 1 , . . . , B n ∈ {0, 1} , respectively, which are distributed uniformly at random conditioned on A J 0 = B J 0 . If Alice and Bob have r + 2 rounds, then the following protocol generates secret keys distributed uniformly on {0, 1} : Alice sends Bob I 0 , who responds with Σ 1 (I 0 ), Alice responds with Σ 2 (Σ 1 (I 0 )), and so on, until both parties possess J 0 , at which point they can output
To prove that Alice and Bob cannot generate shared common random strings with high entropy and communication n/ log ω(1) n (item (2) of Theorem 2.1), the following approach was used: Bafna et al. [BGGS18] first reduced the problem to showing that Alice and Bob cannot succeed with high probability on a distributional version of the following communication problem: Alice receives
This problem, called pointer verification, has a protocol with (r + 5)/2 rounds and communication O(log n), given by Alice and Bob chasing the pointers forwards and backwards simultaneously. Bafna et al. [BGGS18] showed however that there is no protocol with (r+3)/2 rounds and communication n/ log ω(1) n, and this led to item (2) of Theorem 2.1. We are able to prove Theorem 2.2 by employing a reduction from the CRG/SKG problem to the pointer verification problem with indices in [n 2 ] (as opposed to in [n]) and with 2r permutations (as opposed to r permutations).
The proof of Theorem 2.3 (in particular, of the lower bounds (2) and (3) in the theorem, as (1) is immediate) is somewhat more involved. The overall goal is to reduce to the non-amortized case (Theorems 2.1 and 2.2), and to do this, three main ingredients are needed. The first ingredient is a characterization of the achievable rate region T r (X, Y ) for CRG in terms of the internal information cost and external information cost [BBCR13] of private-coin communication protocols, which has been referred to many times in the literature (e.g., [STW19, GJ18] ). This characterization shows that that if for L ≤ , the pair (C, L) is r-achievable for CRG from µ r,n, (i.e., belongs to T r (X, Y )), then there is an r-round private-coin protocol Π with inputs (X, Y ) ∼ µ r,n, with internal information cost at most C and external information cost at least L (see Corollary 4.3).
The second ingredient of the proof is a result of Jain et al. [JPY12] (which is implicit in the earlier work of Braverman and Rao [BR11] ) stating that for any r-round protocolΠ with internal information cost I, there exists an r-round protocolΠ that simulatesΠ up to some accuracy loss and has communication cost at most I+O(r) (see Theorem 4.4). Applying this toΠ = Π, one might hope to show that Π leads to a protocol with communication O(C) and key length Ω(L) for non-amortized CRG. However, the error introduced in the information-to-communication compression result of Jain et al. [JPY12] makes this conclusion nontrivial, which necessitates the third ingredient: a delicate argument that makes use of the specific structure of µ r,n, is needed to complete the reduction (see Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6).
Proof of Theorem 2.2; non-amortized setting
In this section we prove Theorem 2.2. To prove this theorem we need to introduce the pointer chasing source of [BGGS18] , and also recall the notion of "indistinguishability" of two distributions to low-round low-communication protocols. We then state our main technical theorem (Theorem 3.3) about the indistinguishability of the pointer chasing source from an "independent source" (where Alice and Bob get inputs that are independent of each other). Section 3.1 is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.3. We begin by formally defining the pointer-chasing source µ r,n, that the theorem uses to achieve the rounds-communication tradeoff.
Definition 3.1 (The Pointer Chasing Source µ r,n, , [BGGS18] , Definition 2.1). For positive integers r, n and , the support of µ = µ r,n, is (S
• I ∈ [n] and Σ 1 , . . . , Σ r ∈ S n are sampled uniformly and independently.
•
• A J = B J ∈ {0, 1} is sampled uniformly and independently of I and Σ's.
• For every k = J, A k ∈ {0, 1} and B k ∈ {0, 1} are sampled uniformly and independently.
We use the following notational convention for samples (X, Y ) ∼ µ r,n, . We write I 0 := I, and for 1 ≤ t ≤ r, I t := Σ t (I t−1 ). Similarly, we write J 0 := J, and for 1 ≤ t ≤ r, J t−1 = Σ −1 t (J t ). Over the distribution µ r,n, , we thus have I t = J r−t for 0 ≤ t ≤ r with probability 1.
We establish the following basic property of the pointer chasing source µ r,n, for future reference:
Proof. Notice that H(X) = r log(n!) + n since Σ 1 , Σ 3 , . . . , Σ 2 r/2 −1 are uniformly random in S n and A 1 , . . . , A n are uniformly random in {0, 1} . Moreover,
It is immediate from the definition of µ r,n, that part (1) (i.e., the upper bound) of Theorem 2.2 holds: in particular, the parties "chase the pointers", i.e., alternatively send I t , 0 ≤ t ≤ r, and finally output A Ir = B Ir as their keys. The main content of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 is then in part (2) (i.e., the lower bound) of each; its proof, for both theorems, proceeds via arguments about indistinguishbility of inputs to protocols, which we will now define. For r, C ∈ R + , we say that a communication protocol Π is an (r, C) protocol if Π has at most r rounds and communication cost at most C . Two distributions µ 1 , µ 2 are ( , C, r)-indistinguishable if they are -indistinguishable to every (r, C) protocol. The distributions µ 1 , µ 2 are ( , C, r)-distinguishable if they are not ( , C, r)-indistinguishable. If Π is a protocol such that the total variation distance of the transcript between inputs (X, Y ) ∼ µ 1 and inputs (X, Y ) ∼ µ 2 is at least , then we say that Π distinguishes between µ 1 and µ 2 with advantage . Proposition 3.2 reduces the problem of showing that certain tuples (C, L) are not achievable for CRG from µ r,n, to that of showing indistinguishability of µ r,n, from the product of its marginals (µ r,n, ) X ⊗ (µ r,n, ) Y .
Proposition 3.2 ([BGGS18], Propositions 3.3 & 3.4).
There are positive constants η, ξ such that the following holds. Suppose ρ, C, L ∈ N and 0 < γ < 1. Suppose that C < ηL − 3/2 · log 1/γ − ξ and that the tuple (C, L, 1 − γ) is ρ-achievable for CRG from the source µ r,n, . Then there is some N ∈ N such that µ r,n,N and (µ r,n,N ) X ⊗ (µ r,n,N ) Y are (γ/10, C + ξ log 1/γ, ρ + 1)-distinguishable.
Our main theorem for this section is the following indistiguishability result for µ = µ r,n, versus µ X × µ Y . In contrast to the analogous result in [BGGS18, Lemma 4.5], our result shows indistinguishability for protocols with r + 1 rounds albeit with a smaller communication budget.
Theorem 3.3. For every > 0 and r ∈ N there exists β, n 0 such that for every n ≥ n 0 and , the distributions µ = µ r,n, and
Using Proposition 3.2, the proof of Theorem 2.2 follows from Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We need to show item (2) . Fix > 0 and r ∈ N. Let ξ, η be the constants from Proposition 3.2. Also let β 0 be the constant β from Theorem 3.3 with (1 − )/20 as the variational distance parameter. Also let β be a constant such that β > max{β 0 , 3/2·log 1/(1− )+ξ} and √ n/ log β n + ξ log 1/(1 − ) ≤ √ n/ log β 0 n, which is possible for sufficiently large n. Suppose for purpose of contradiction that for some L > 0, the tuple (min{ηL − β, √ n/ log β n}, L, ) were r-achievable for CRG from µ r,n, . Since β > 3/2 log 1/(1 − ) + ξ, it follows from Proposition 3.2 that for some N ∈ N, µ r,n, N and (µ r,n, N ) X ⊗ (µ r,n, N ) Y are ((1 − )/10, √ n/ log β 0 n, r + 1)-distinguishable. But this contradictions Theorem 3.3, which states that (µ r,n,
To complete the proof of Theorem 2.2 it therefore suffices to prove Theorem 3.3. We do so in the following subsection.
Disjointness and Proof of Theorem 3.3
Next we work towards the proof of Theorem 3.3; the proof parallels that of a corresponding result of Bafna et al., which shows that the distributions µ = µ r,n, and µ X ⊗µ Y are ( , (r+3)/2 , n/ log β n)-indistinguishable (see [BGGS18, Lemma 4.5]). A central ingredient in the proof of [BGGS18] is a "pointer verification problem" (see Definition 3.3 below) and an indistinguishability result they show for this problem (see Theorem 3.6). We use the same notion and indistiguishability result, with the main difference being that we are able to reduce a "2r"-round pointer verification problem to our problem whereas the proof in [BGGS18] could only reduce an rround pointer verification problem to the same. This factor of 2 leads to the gain in this section.
The proof proceeds by eliminating each of two possible strategies Alice and Bob can use to distinguish µ r,n, and (µ r,n, ) X ⊗(µ r,n, ) Y : first, they can try to follow the chain of pointers, compute I r , and check if A Ir = B Ir (which is true with probability 1 under µ r,n, but only with probability 1/2 under (µ r,n, ) X ⊗ (µ r,n, ) Y ). Computing I r , however, with fewer than r + 2 rounds requires communication Ω(n) by standard results for the pointer chasing problem [NW93] . Alternatively, Alice and Bob can ignore the chain of pointers and try to determine if there is any i such that A i = B i (under the product distribution the probability that such an i exists is at most n/2 1). As observed in [BGGS18] , determining the existence of such an i is no easier than solving the set disjointness problem [Raz92] , which requires communcation Ω(n). However, combining the pointer chasing and set disjointness lower bounds takes some care, and ultimately leads to the fact that we are only able to lower-bound the communication cost of r-round (as opposed to (r + 1)-round) protocols, and get a bound ofΩ( √ n) (as opposed toΩ(n)). We begin by recalling the Ω(n) lower bound on the distributional communication complexity of disjointness with respect to a particular distribution: 
and that is distributed according to Disj
In particular, Alice and Bob first construct sets (Ũ,Ṽ ) as follows: for each u ∈ U ⊂ [n], Alice places the elements (u − 1)n + j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n} inŨ , and Bob constructsṼ in an analogous fashion. Then, using public randomness, they randomly permute the elements ofŨ,Ṽ (according to the same permutation) to obtain sets U , V . It is clear that 
), and are defined as follows:
).
is sampled by letting Σ 1 , Σ 2 , . . . , Σ r be independent and uniform over S n , letting I 0 ∈ [n] be uniform and independent of the Σ t , and setting
Notice that with (r+5)/2 rounds of communication, by communicating at most 1+(r+1) log n bits, Alice and Bob can distinguish between D Y PV (r, n) and D N PV (r, n) with advantage 1 − 1/n. In particular, Alice sends Bob an arbitrary bit in the first round, Bob sends I 0 , J 0 in the second round, Alice responds with I 1 = Σ 1 (I 0 ) and 
Using Theorem 3.6 and Corollary 3.5, we now prove Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We introduce a new distribution, which we denote byμ (orμ r,n, when we want to emphasize dependence on r, n, );μ is a distribution supported on (S r/2 n
We denote a sample fromμ by (X, Y ), with
which is distributed as follows:
• I 0 ∈ [n] and Σ 1 , . . . , Σ r ∈ S n are sampled uniformly and independently. Let I r = Σ r • · · · • Σ 1 (I 0 ).
• Let P ⊂ [n] be a uniformly random subset of size √ n , conditioned on the event that it contains I r .
• For every j ∈ P , A j = B j ∈ {0, 1} L is sampled uniformly and independently of i, Σ's, and P .
• For every j ∈ P , A j , B j ∈ {0, 1} L are sampled uniformly and independently (and independently of all Σ's, j, and P ).
Claim 3.7. For every > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that the distributions µ r,n, andμ r,n, are
Proof of Claim 3.7. We show that any protocol Π with CC(Π) ≤ C distinguishing µ = µ r,n, and µ =μ r,n, with advantage can be converted into a protocol Π with CC(Π ) ≤ C and which distinguishes Disj 3m strings A 1 , . . . , A m , B 1 , . . . , B m , C 1 , . . . , C m ∈ {0, 1} uniformly and independently using public randomness. Then for 1 ≤ u ≤ m, Alice sets:
and Bob sets:
It is now clear that the tuple
is distributed according to µ r,m, if (U, V ) ∼ Disj 
, the lemma statement follows.
Next, notice that the two distributions (µ r,n, ) X ⊗(µ r,n, ) Y and (μ r,n, ) X ⊗(μ r,n, ) Y are identical. Thus by Claim 3.7 and the triangle inequality for total variation distance, Theorem 3.3 will follow from the following claim:
Claim 3.8. For every > 0 and r ∈ N there exists β, n 0 such that for every n ≥ n 0 and , the distributionsμ =μ r,n, andμ X ⊗μ Y are (2 , r + 1, √ n/ log β n)-indistinguishable.
We next introduce a distribution µ mid = µ mid r,n, , which is the same asμ r,n, , except the distribution of the uniformly random subset P ⊂ [n] with |P | = √ n is not conditioned on the event that it contains I r (i.e. it is drawn uniformly at random from the set of all √ n-element sets, independent of I 0 , Σ 1 , . . . , Σ r ). Thus, with probability at least 1 − 1/ √ n, I r ∈ P under µ mid . Now Claim 3.8 follows directly from the triangle inequality and Claims 3.9 and 3.10 below.
Claim 3.9. For every > 0 and r ∈ N there exists β, n 0 ∈ R + such that for all integers n ≥ n 0 and , the distributionsμ r,n, and µ mid r,n, are ( , r + 1,
Claim 3.10. For every > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that µ mid r,n, and (μ r,n,
Now we prove each of Claims 3.9 and 3.10 in turn.
Proof of Claim 3.9. We first prove the statement of the claim for the case that n is a perfect square. Fix r, n, , and suppose that Π is a ρ-round protocol (ρ ∈ N) with communication at most C that distinguishes betweenμ r,n 2 , from µ mid r,n 2 , with advantage . (Notice that we are replacing n with n 2 in the notation.)
We now construct a protocol Π with the same number of rounds and communication as Π and which distinguishes between D Y PV (2r − 1, n) and D N PV (2r − 1, n) with advantage at least . Suppose Alice and Bob are given inputs X = (Σ 1 , Σ 3 , . . . , Σ 2r−1 ) and Y = (I 0 , J 0 , Σ 2 , Σ 4 , . . . , Σ 2r−2 ), respectively, which are distributed according to
, so that any pair σ, τ ∈ S n of permutations on [n] determines a permutation on [n 2 ], which we denote by σ||τ , so that (σ||τ )((i, j)) = (σ(i), τ (j)). (Note that the vast majority of permutations on [n 2 ] cannot be obtained in this manner, however.) The protocol Π proceeds as follows:
1. Alice and Bob use their common randomness to generate uniformly random permutations τ 0 , τ 1 , . . . , τ r ∈ S n 2 and uniformly random strings A 1 , . . . , A n 2 −n , B 1 , . . . , B n 2 −n , C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ {0, 1} .
Bob computesÎ
3. For t = 1, 3, . . . , 2 (r + 1)/2 , Alice computesΣ
4. For t = 2, 4, . . . , 2 r/2 , Bob computesΣ
5. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Alice and Bob setÂ τr((i,i)) =B τr((i,i)) = C i .
6. For the n 2 − n pairs (i, j) ∈ [n] × [n] with i = j, Alice setsÂ (i,j) to be equal to one of the A k , 1 ≤ k ≤ n 2 − n so that each A k is used once. Bob does the same withB (i,j) with respect to the B k .
7. Alice and Bob now run the protocol Π on the inputsX :
Certainly the communication cost and number of rounds of Π are both the same as the communication cost and number of rounds, respectively, of Π. We will show that (1) 
. Then the distribution of Σ 1 , . . . , Σ 2r , I 0 , J 0 may be expressed equivalently as follows: X, Y are chosen as follows: Σ 1 , . . . , Σ 2r are first drawn uniformly and independently form S n , an index I r ∈ [n] is chosen uniformly in [n] independent of Σ 1 , . . . , Σ 2r , and then we set J 0 = Σ 2r • · · · • Σ r+1 (I r ) and
Notice that the set P := {τ r ((i, i)) : i ∈ [n]} is a uniformly random set of size n in [n 2 ] [n]×[n]. Next, note that if π is any distribution on S n 2 and τ is distributed uniformly on S n 2 , then π • τ is distributed uniformly on S n 2 . It follows from this factΣ 1 , . . . ,Σ r are distributed uniformly and independently in S n 2 , all independent of the set P = {τ r ((i, i)) : i ∈ [n]}. Next, we have that
where we have used the fact that (X, Y ) ∼ D Y PV (2r − 1, n) in the last line. Recall from the discussion above that I r is independent of Σ 1 , . . . , Σ 2r , τ 0 , . . . , τ r , and therefore τ r ((I r , I r )) is a uniformly random element of the set P = {τ r ((i, i)) : i ∈ [n]}, independent ofΣ 1 , . . . ,Σ r , P . Therefore,Î 0 is a uniformly random element of [2n], independent of P,Σ 1 , . . . ,Σ r , conditioned on the eventΣ r • · · · •Σ 1 (Î 0 ) ∈ P . This establishes that (X,Ŷ ) ∼μ r,n 2 , , finishing the proof of point (1).
We next prove (2); suppose that (X, Y ) ∼ D N PV (2r − 1, n). Then all of the random variables Σ 1 , . . . , Σ 2r ∈ S n 2 , and I 0 , J 0 ∈ [n] are uniform and independent on their respective domains. Moreover, the set P := {τ r ((i, i)) : i ∈ [n]} is a uniformly random set of size n in [n 2 ] [n] × [n]. ThusΣ 1 , . . . ,Σ r ∈ S n 2 are uniform and independent in S n 2 , independent of P , andÎ 0 ∈ [n 2 ] is uniform, independent of P,Σ 1 , . . . ,Σ r . This establishes that in this case (X,Ŷ ) ∼ µ mid r,n 2 , . Thus the distribution of the transcript of Π (excluding the additional public randomness used by Π in the simulation above) when run on D Y PV (respectively, D N PV ) is the same as the distribution of the transcript of Π when run onμ r,n 2 , (respectively, µ mid r,n 2 , ). It then follows from Theorem 3.6 and the fact that ((2r − 1) + 3)/2 = r + 1 that for every > 0, there exists β, n 0 ∈ R + such that for all ∈ N and perfect squares n ≥ n 0 , the distributionsμ r,n, and µ mid r,n, are ( , r + 1,
The case that n is not a perfect square follows immediately: in particular, given a sample (X, Y ) from eitherμ r,n, or µ mid r,n, , let m denote the smallest perfect square greater than n. Notice that by viewing [n] as a subset of [m] and using public randomness Alice and Bob can create a sample (X , Y ) that is sampled fromμ r,m, if (X, Y ) ∼μ r,n, and that is sampled from µ mid r,m, if (X, Y ) ∼ µ mid r,n, with no communication.
Next, Claim 3.10 follows as a simple corollary of Corollary 3.5.
Proof of Claim 3.10. The proof is similar to that of Claim 3.7. We reduce the task of distinguishing µ mid r,n, and (μ r,n, ) X ⊗ (μ r,n, ) Y to the task of distinguishing Disj In particular, suppose Alice and Bob are given U, V ⊆ [n]. Alice and Bob share common random uniform strings Z 1 , . . . , Z n ∈ {0, 1} . Given U ⊂ [n], Alice sets A u = Z u for u ∈ U and samples A u ∈ {0, 1} uniformly and independently for all u ∈ [n]\U . Similarly, for V ⊂ [n], Bob sets B v = Z v for v ∈ V , and samples B v ∈ {0, 1} uniformly and independently for all v ∈ [n]\V . Alice also samples Σ 1 , Σ 3 , . . . , Σ r ∈ S n uniformly and independently and Bob samples Σ 2 , Σ 4 , . . . , Σ r−1 ∈ S n , I, J ∈ [n] uniformly and independently. Letting X = (Σ 1 , Σ 3 , . . . , Σ r , A 1 , . . . , A n ) and Y = (I, J, Σ 2 , Σ 4 , . . . , Σ r−1 , B 1 , . . . , B n ), it is easy to see that (X,
n . It follows from Corollary 3.5 that for any > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that µ mid r,n, and (μ r,n,
We have now verified Claims 3.9, 3.10, which establishes Claim 3.8, which completes the proof of Theorem 3.3, and thus of Theorem 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 2.3; amortized setting
In this section we work towards the proof of Theorem 2.3; recall that part (1) is immediate, so the main work is in proving parts (2) and (3). As discussed in Section 2.6, there are 3 main steps in the proof, which proceeds by initially assuming that the tuple (C, L) is r-achievable for appropriate values of C, L and eventually deriving a contradiction. The first step is to establish a single-letter characterization 4 of the achievable rate region T r (X, Y ) for amortized CRG, which we explain in Section 4.1. This single-letter characterization will show that if the tuple (C, L) is r-achievable for CRG from any source µ, then there is an r-round protocol with internal information cost at most C and external information cost at least L. In Section 4.2, we show how to convert this protocol into a nearly equivalent protocol whose communication cost is at most C (recall that in general, CC(Π) ≥ IC int µ (Π), so upper bounding communication cost is more difficult). Finally, in Section 4.3 we show how to use the fact that the external information cost is at least L to obtain a protocol that can distinguish between the pointer-chasing distribution µ r,n, and the product of the marginals (µ r,n, ) X ⊗ (µ r,n, ) Y . At this point we will obtain a contradiction for appropriate values of C, L by Theorems 3.3 and 4.11, which were the key ingredients in the proof for the corresponding lower bounds in the non-amortized setting (i.e., item (2) of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2).
Single-letter characterization of T r (X, Y )
It follows immediately from Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 that the r-round rate region for amortized CRG and SKG is completely characterized by, for each communication rate C, the maximum real number L, known as the capacity, such that (C, L) is r-achievable for CRG or SKG: L.
4 The term "single-letter characterization" is used relatively loosely in the literature. Following [CK81] , for any k ∈ N and a closed subset S ⊂ R k , we call a characterization of S a single-letter characterization if it implies, for any η > 0, the existence of an algorithm that decides whether a point x ∈ R k is of Euclidean distance at most η to S. Moreover, this algorithm must run in time at most TS (η), for some function TS : R+ → N. This is related, for instance, to ideas on the computability of subsets of R k considered in [Bra05] .
The single-letter characterization of T r (X, Y ) relies on the concepts of internal information cost and external information cost of a protocol Π [BBCR13, BR11, BRWY13, BGPW13, Bra12]. The external information cost of a (multiple-round) protocol Π describes how much information Π reveals about the inputs X, Y to an external observer who only sees the transcript of the protocol, while the internal information cost describes how much information Alice and Bob reveal to each other about their own inputs: Remark 4.3. It is well-known that for any distribution µ, and any protocol Π,
An original motivation behind the introduction of internal and external information costs was to understand the possibility of proving direct sum results for communication complexity [CSWY01, JRS03, HJMR07, BBCR13] . In light of the connection with direct sum results, the fact that internal and external information costs appear in characterizations for amortized CRG and SKG is not surprising. In particular, the amortized CRG and SKG problems can be viewed as the task of solving N independent instances of CRG or SKG from a source µ, with an additional requirement that each of Alice's N output strings must agree with each of Bob's N output strings simultaneously with high probability.
An additional ingredient in the single-letter chararcterization of T r (X, Y ) is the minimum rround interaction for maximum key rate (i.e., the r-round MIMK). Ahlswede and Csiszár showed in their seminal work [AC93] that the maximum key rate L that Alice and Bob can generate from a source (X, Y ) ∼ µ, without restricting communication, is I µ (X; Y ). In other words, we have: 
Using the compression of internal information to communication
A crucial technical ingredient in doing so is the use of an "compression of internal information cost to communication" result for bounded round protocols, saying that for any protocol with a fixed number r of rounds and internal information cost I, there is another protocol with the same number r of rounds and communication cost not much larger than I. As we discussed in Section 2, these types of theorems were originally proved in order to establish direct sum and direct product results for communication complexity. Our use of these compression results may be interpreted as a roughly analogous approach for the setting of amortized CRG and SKG, which can be thought of as the "direct sum version of non-amortized CRG and SKG". Lemma 4.5. Fix any r, n, ∈ N, and let µ = µ r,n, . Suppose ρ ∈ N and C, L ∈ R + . Suppose Π is a ρ-round protocol with IC ext µ (Π) = L and IC int µ (Π) = C and public randomness R Pub (and which may use private randomness as well). Then for every > 0 there is some ρ-round protocol Π with inputs (X, Y ) ∼ µ, public randomness R Pub , with communication at most C+5ρ + O(ρ log 1/ ) and which outputs keys K A , K B , such that
When inputs (X, Y ) are drawn from µ, I(K
and
Proof. Let Π be the protocol given by Theorem 4.4 for the protocol Π and the given . Then the communication of Π is at most C+5ρ + O(ρ log 1/ )). At the end of Π , Alice and Bob each possess a random variable (Π 1 , . . . ,Π ρ ), such that, when (X, Y ) ∼ µ,
. . ,Π ρ ), which immediately establishes item (1) of the lemma. To establish point (2), we will first argue that it holds for Π; in particular we show that when
(Since H(B ir ) = it will follow from (9) that I µ (Π ρ ; B Ir ) ≥ L − C − 2 log n, though we will not use this directly.) To see this, first notice that 5
Recalling the notation I r = Σ r • · · · • Σ 1 (I 0 ), we observe by Lemma 6.2 and the data processing inequality that
since H(A Ir |B Ir , Π ρ ) = H(A Ir |B Ir ) = 0 as A Ir = B Ir for all inputs in the support of µ. It then follows that H(B Ir |Π ρ , R Pub ) ≤ + C − L + 2 log n, establishing (9). Next, (8) and the data processing inequality give us that ∆((R Pub , B Ir , Π ρ ), (R Pub , B Ir ,Π ρ )) ≤ 6 ρ. Corollary 6.5 and (9) then give that
Since K A =Π ρ , we get that
which establishes point (2) . Finally, to establish point (3), first notice that some inputs (X, Y ) ∼ µ X ⊗ µ Y may not be in the support of µ. We may extend the protocol Π to be defined for all pairs of inputs (X, Y ) ∈ X ×Y, by choosing an arbitrary behavior (e.g., terminating immediately) whenever there is a partial transcript (Π ) t−1 for which the distribution of the next message Π t has not been defined.
Recall that (Π 1 , . . . , Π ρ ) denotes the transcript of communication of Π and R Pub is the public randomness of Π , so that when (X,
Recalling that K A =Π ρ , by construction of Π (andΠ) from Theorem 4.4, it follows that
is a Markov chain. It then follows from the data processing inequality that
which gives (6); (7) follows in a similar manner.
Roughly speaking, the next lemma, Lemma 4.6, shows how the protocol Π constructed in Lemma 4.5 can use the properties (2) and (3) of Lemma 4.5 to distinguish between the distributions µ (ν 1 in the below statement) and µ X ⊗ µ Y (ν 2 in the below statement). This, in combination with the result from Theorem 3.3 stating that µ and µ X ⊗ µ Y are indistinguishable to protocols with little communication, will ultimately complete the proof of Theorem 2.3. Lemma 4.6. Suppose ν 1 , ν 2 are distributions over tuples of random variables (Z 1 , . . . , Z n , I, K,K), where Z 1 , . . . , Z n ∈ {0, 1} , I ∈ [n], and K ∈ K, where K is a finite set. Suppose that the marginal distribution of Z 1 , . . . , Z n , I over each of ν 1 , ν 2 is uniform over {0, 1} n × [n]. Finally suppose that 0 < ξ < 1 and C satisfy log n ≤ C ≤ (1−ξ) 3 1620 as well as:
Then there is some function f : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} such that
We first establish some basic lemmas before proving Lemma 4.6.
Lemma 4.7. Suppose W ∈ {0, 1} is a random variable, and H(W ) = c. For any δ ∈ (0, 1] there is some set S ⊂ {0, 1} such that |S| ≤ 2 c/δ and P[W ∈ S] ≤ δ.
, so the probability that
Clearly, by the definition of S, we have that |S| ≤ 2 c/δ .
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that random variables I, Z 1 , . . . , Z n are distributed jointly so that the marginal of Z 1 , . . . , Z n ∈ {0, 1} is uniform on {0, 1} n . Then H(Z I ) ≥ − log n.
Proof. Notice that
where addition of subscripts is taken modulo n. Since (Z I+1 , . . . , Z I+n−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} n− , we get that
Lemma 4.9. Suppose that W ∈ {0, 1} is a random variable with H(W ) = h ≤ . Let S ⊂ {0, 1} be a subset with size |S| ≤ 2 c , for some c < .
Now we prove Lemma 4.6.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. We will first define f and determine a lower bound on
Pick some η > 1, ζ > 1 to be specified later. By Lemma 4.7, for each k ∈ K, there is a set T k ⊂ {0, 1} of size at most 2 ηγ k such that
, and for all k ∈ S, |T k | ≤ 2 ηζξ < 2 ηζ . We now set
Next we determine an upper bound on
. By Lemma 6.2 and the data processing inequality, we have that
We must have that ∆(K ν 2 , K ν 1 ) < p, else we could choose f to be a function of only K and would get that |E
log n, and that − h K ≥ 0 with probability 1. Therefore,
where the last inequality follows from C ≤ (ξ ) 3 1620 . Since K =K over ν 2 and are only nonequal with probability at most p/2 over ν 1 , it follows that
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2.3
Using Lemmas 4.5, 4.6, and Theorem 4.2, we now may prove Theorem 2.3:
Proof of Theorem 2.3. The first part of Theorem 2.3 follows in the same way as the amortized case: given N i.i.d. samples of (X, Y ) ∼ µ r,n, , by following the pointers for each sample, Alice and Bob can use r + 2 rounds of communication (simultaneously over all samples), communicate a total of (r + 2) log n bits, and generate N i.i.d. strings uniformly distributed on {0, 1} . Their resulting keys (of length N ) will agree with probability 1 and be independent of the transcript of communication.
To prove the second part of Theorem 2.3, first suppose r is odd. We take µ = µ r,n, and set = γ/(54(r + 1)).
We argue by contradiction. Suppose the theorem statement is false: namely, that for some C ≤ n/ log c 0 n and L > γ , the tuple (C, L) is (r + 1)/2 -achievable from µ. We can assume without loss of generality that L < . By Theorem 4.2 (and in particular, Corollary 4.3), since 
Next, let Π be the protocol where the parties run Π , and the last party (suppose it is Alice, for concreteness) to speak in Π sends over a random hash h(K A ) of length O(log 1/γ), so that for any
, and the other party, Bob, outputs a final bit equal to
For sufficiently large n, we have that
Claim 4.10. Π distinguishes µ and µ X ⊗ µ Y with advantage at least γ 2 /324.
Proof. To prove Claim 4.10, we consider two cases. The first case is that
. In this case, the last bit output by Bob will be 0 with probability at least γ 2 /648 when (X, Y ) ∼ µ X ⊗ µ Y . Since K A = K B with probability 1 when (X, Y ) ∼ µ, it follows that Π distinguishes between the two distributions with advantage at least γ 2 /648 in this case.
The second case is that
. Here we will use Lemma 4.6. Since 18 (r + 1) ≤ γ/3, and since for sufficiently large n, C + 1 + 2 log n ≤ γn/3 = γ /3, we see that
We apply Lemma 4.6, with (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) = (B 1 , . . . , B n ),
Here we use that n/ log
for sufficiently large n (depending on γ), as well as
. Then Lemma 4.6 gives that Bob can output a bit as a deterministic function of K B , B 1 , . . . , B n (all of which Bob holds at the conclusion of Π ), that distinguishes µ and µ X ⊗ µ Y with advantage at least γ 2 /324. By Theorem 4.11 below (which is analogous to Theorem 3.3), with = γ 2 /324, and as long as c 0 is large enough so that the right-hand side of (12) holds for n ≥ c 0 , and such that c 0 − 1 ≥ β (where β is chosen from Theorem 4.11, given = γ 2 /325), we arrive at a contradiction.
Theorem 4.11 ([BGGS18], Lemma 4.5). For every > 0 and odd r there exists β, n 0 such that for every n ≥ n 0 and , the distributions µ = µ r,n, and µ X ⊗ µ Y are ( , (r + 3)/2, n/ log β n)-indistinguishable.
For even r, we use the distribution µ = µ r−1,n, . Part (1) of the theorem still holds (in fact, we even have (r + 1)-achievability). For part (2), the argument above applies, except now the lower bound on round complexity is ((r − 1) + 1)/2 = r/2 = r/2.
Finally, to prove part (3) of Theorem 2.3, an argument virtually identical to the one for part (2) applies, except that the protocols Π and Π have r rounds, the protocol Π has r + 1 rounds, and the upper bound in (12) is √ n/ log (c 0 −1) n, which needs to be less than
1620 (which it is, for sufficiently large n). In the last step fo the proof, we use Theorem 3.3 (instead of Theorem 4.11), which establishes that µ and µ X ⊗ µ Y are ( , r + 1, √ n/ poly log n)-indistinguishable for any constant > 0.
Separations in MIMK
In this section we use Theorem 2.3 to derive separations in the MIMK for the pointer chasing source µ r,n, (recall Definition 4.4). The below Theorem 4.12 generalizes a result of Tyagi [Tya13] , which established a constant-factor separation in the MIMK for 2-round and 1-round protocols for a certain source.
Theorem 4.12. For each r ∈ N, there is a c 0 such that for each n ≥ c 0 , the pointer chasing source µ r,n,n satisfies:
Proof. Let the constant c 0 be that given by Theorem 2.3 for an arbitrary γ. The first item follows from the definition of I r (X; Y ) in Definition 4.4, the fact that I µr,n,n (X; Y ) = n (Lemma 3.1), and the first item of Theorem 2.3 stating that the tuple ((r + 2) log n , n) is (r + 2)-achievable for SKG from the source µ r,n,n .
To see the second item, suppose that I (r+1)/2 (X; Y ) ≤ n/ log c 0 n. Then the tuple (n/ log c 0 n, ) is (r + 1)/2 -achievable from the source µ r,n,n , contradicting the second item of Theorem 2.3.
Similarly, for the third item, if I r (X; Y ) ≤ √ n/ log c 0 n, then the tuple ( √ n/ log c 0 n, ) would be r-achievable from the source µ r,n,n , contradicting the third item of Theorem 2.3.
Notice that the MIMK deals with very large rates of communication; in particular, communication at rates larger than the MIMK is no longer interesting, as, for instance, the entropy rate L for SKG is fixed at I(X; Y ). One can ask, on the other hand, whether Theorem 2.3 allows us to determine a separation in some measure that determines the efficiency of CRG and SKG at very small rates of communication. Formally, we consider the common random bits per r-round interaction bit (r-round CBIB) and the secret key bits per r-round interaction bit (r-round KBIB):
Definition 4.6 ([LCV17], Corollary 2 6 ). For a source (X, Y ) ∼ µ and r ∈ N, define:
Notice that Γ cr r (X, Y ) and Γ sk r (X, Y ) can be infinite, if, for instance, there are functions f A : X → {0, 1} and f B : Y → {0, 1} such that
. Intuitively, the r-round CBIB (KBIB, respectively) can be roughly interpreted as the maximum number of additional bits of common randomness (secret key, respectively) that Alice and Bob can obtain by communicating an additional bit, where the maximum is over "all protocols and any communication rate".
We also remark that it follows from Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 5.4 that Γ cr r (X, Y ) is the derivative of the function C am-cr r (C) at C = 0. Next we would like to derive similar separations for the r-round interactive CBIB and KBIB to that in Theorem 4.12 for the r-round MIMK. Notice that from the first item of Theorem 2.3 we have immediately that Γ cr r+2 (X, Y ) ≥ n (r+2) log n . We might hope to use the second and third items of Theorem 2.3 to derive upper bounds on Γ cr (r+1)/2 (X, Y ) and Γ cr r (X, Y ) that grow as log c 0 n and √ n log c 0 n, respectively. However, such upper bounds do not immediately follow from Theorem 2.3 since Theorem 2.3 requires a lower bound on L in order to show that certain tuples (C, L) are not achievable. In particular, Theorem 2.3 leaves open the possibility that tuples such as (log n, √ n), or even (2 −n , 1) are (r + 1)/2 -achievable for CRG from µ r,n,n . This limitation of Theorem 2.3 results from the fact that Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6 give vacuous bounds on the disintuishability of µ = µ r,n,n and µ X ⊗ µ Y when the tuple (C, L) is such that L is small compared to n. We leave the problem of remedying this issue for future work:
Problem 4.7. For each r ∈ N, show (perhaps using Theorem 2.3) that there is a c 0 , such that for each n ≥ c 0 , the pointer chasing source (X, Y ) ∼ µ r,n,n satisfies:
It seems that in fact the even stronger result Γ cr r+1 (X, Y ) ≤ 1 + o n (1) holds.
Problem 4.7 seems to be quite difficult; a result that Γ cr r (X, Y ) < f (n), for (X, Y ) ∼ µ r,n,n , some r ∈ N, and some function f (n) would imply, by concavity of the function C → C am-cr r (C) (Lemma 5.4), that for any C ≥ 1, the tuple (C, f (n) · C) is not r -achievable for CRG from µ r,n,n . For r = (r + 1)/2 and f (n) = poly log(n), this would imply part (2) of Theorem 2.3, and for r = r and f (n) = √ n poly log(n), this would imply part (3) of Theorem 2.3.
5 Proof of the converse direction of Theorem 4.2
Recall our definition of
Our goal in this section is to establish the following:
Theorem 5.1 essentially states that any (private-coin) protocol Π for CRG can be converted into a (private-coin) protocol whose internal and external information costs are related to the communication and common randomness rates of Π in a particular way. We prove Theorem 5.1 by first establishing such a statement for deterministic protocols in Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3 below. We will then use certain properties ofC am-cr r (C) to "upgrade" this statement to apply to randomized protocols.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose (X, Y ) ∼ µ for some source µ, and that the tuple (C, L), for C, L ∈ R + is achievable by an r-round deterministic protocol (in the sense of Definition 2.1; that is, all properties of Definition 2.1 hold verbatim, except Π is not allowed to use private random coins). Then for any L < L, C > C, there is some N 0 such that for all N ≥ N 0 , there is an r-round deterministic protocol Π with inputs (X N , Y N ) ∼ µ ⊗N such that
Proof. Choose C with C > C > C and L with L < L < L. By Definition 2.1, there is some N 0 so that for each N ≥ N 0 , there is an r-round protocol Π taking inputs from µ ⊗N and producing keys
(Here K ∈ K N denotes the random variable uniformly distributed on K N .) By truncating the keys we may assume without loss of generality that
Moreover, using Lemma 6.4, we obtain
where we have used N ≤
Now let Π be the following protocol:
Suppose for simplicity that r is odd, so that Alice is the last person to speak in Π (the case r even is nearly identical). Then since Π is deterministic, K A , Π r is a deterministic function of X, Y , so H(K A , Π r |X, Y ) = 0. Noting the transcript of Π is given by (Π 1 , . . . , Π r−1 , (Π r , K A )), it follows that
where the last inequality uses (13).
To upper bound IC int (Π ), notice that
where we have used Fano's inequality, the fact that P[K A = K B ] ≤ N , and that K B is a deterministic function of Π R , Y N . Moreover, the last inequality uses N <
The next lemma, which states that the internal and external information complexities tensorize (i.e., they satisfy a direct sum property), was proved in [GJ18] .
Lemma 5.3 ([GJ18], Lemma 14).
Suppose that Π is an r-round private-coin protocol with inputs (X N , Y N ) ∼ ν ⊗N . Then there is an r-round private-coin protocol Π with only private randomness, inputs (X, Y ) ∼ ν, such that: 
Then by linearity of expectation,
It follows in an even simpler manner that for all i,
and for even i ∈ [r], Proof. By the support lemma [CK81, Lemma 15.4], we can restrict our attention to protocols Π = (Π 1 , . . . , Π r ) such that Π t , 1 ≤ t ≤ r, falls in a finite set of size U t at most |X ||Y| t−1 t =1 |U t | + 1. For each odd t, the space of all possible Π t is the |X | · t−1 t =1 |U t |-fold product of all probability distributions on U t (as Π t specifies a probability distribution on U t for each possible value of XΠ t−1 ), which is compact, and in fact homeomorphic to a closed ball in some R K . We have an analogous statement for even t, and therefore the space of all possible Π is compact. Since the functions Π → IC . For any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, consider the protocol Π in which Alice uses private randomness to generate a bit B ∈ {0, 1} that is 1 with probability δ and otherwise 0 and sends it to Bob. Then, if B = 1, Alice sends Bob X and the protocol terminates (for a total of 1 ≤ r rounds), and if B = 0, Alice and Bob simulate Π. In a similar manner as above, it is easy to see that
, there is some δ ∈ (0, 1], which we denote by δ , such that 
where the last inequality follows since I(X; Y ) > L − C by assumption that C < I r (X; Y ).
The case r = 1 of the next lemma, Lemma 5.6 was proven as part of the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [AC98] . It is also stated without proof in [STW19] . The proof will use the following elementary fact: the fact that Π = (Π 1 , . . . , Π r ) is an r-round private-coin protocol, is equivalent to the fact that the following Markov conditions hold:
where a source (X, Y ) ∼ µ is fixed and the messages Π 1 , . . . , Π r are random variables.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose that ν is a distribution with samples (XQ A , Y Q B ) ∼ ν, where Q A , Q B are uniform and independent infinite strings of bits that are independent of (X, Y ). Denote the marginal distribution of (X, Y ) by µ. Suppose that Π is an r-round private-coin protocol with inputs (XQ A , Y Q B ) ∼ ν, and write
Then there is a non-negative real number α and a protocol Π with inputs (X, Y ) ∼ µ such that
Proof. The protocol Π proceeds as follows: given inputs (X, Y ) ∼ µ, Alice uses her private randomness to generate a uniform infinite string Q A independent of X and Bob does the same to generate a uniform infinite string Q B . Then certainly the resulting pair (XQ A , Y Q B ) are distributed according to ν. Then Alice and Bob simply run the protocol Π. Notice that the joint distribution of ((Π ) r , (Q A X, Q B , Y )) is identical to the joint distribution of (Π r , (Q A X, Q B Y )). Let O r ⊂ [r] denote the odd integers from 1 to r, and E r ⊂ [r] denote the even integers from 1 to r. That Π is a randomized (private-coin) protocol with inputs (XQ A , Y Q B ) means that the following Markov conditions hold:
It follows immediately from (16) and (17) and the fact that Q A , Q B , and (X, Y ) are all independent that the following Markov conditions also hold:
It follows from (16) 
In a similar manner, it follows from (18) and (19) that 
where the first term of (25) 
Information Theoretic Lemmas
In this section we collect several information theoretic lemmas which are used throughout the paper. The claimed equalities hold by non-negativity of the mutual information.
Pinsker's inequality gives an upper bound on total variation distance in terms of the KL divergence between two distributions. Proposition 6.3 (Pinsker's inequality). Let µ, ν be two distributions supported on a set X . Then
The following lemma implies that the entropy functional H(·) is continuous on the set of distributions on a finite X set with respect to the topology induced by total variation distance. Corollary 6.5. Suppose that X 1 , X 2 are random variables whose distributions are supported on a set X , Y 1 , Y 2 are random variables whose distributions are supported on a set Y, and that each of the pairs (X 1 , Y 1 ) and (X 2 , Y 2 ) are jointly distributed according to some distributions. Let δ = ∆(X 1 Y 1 , X 2 Y 2 ). Then |H(X 1 |Y 1 ) − H(X 2 |Y 2 )| ≤ 1 + 6δ log |X |.
Proof. For x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, write p X 1 Y 1 (x, y) for the probability of the event {X 1 = x, Y 1 = y}, and similarly p X 2 Y 2 (x, y), p Y 1 (y), p Y 2 (y), p X 1 |Y 1 (x|y), p X 2 |Y 2 (x|y), and so on. For any y not in the support of Y 2 , and any x ∈ X , we will write p X 2 |Y 2 (x|y) = H(X 2 |Y 2 = y) = 0 as a notational convention (and similarly for p X 1 |Y 1 (x|y), H(X 1 |Y 1 = y) for y not in the support of Y 1 ). Choose an arbitrary element x * ∈ X , and define a random variableX 2 with support in X that is jointly distributed with Y 1 as follows. 
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A Non-amortized CRG
As opposed to Definition 2.3, much of the literature on the non-amortized CRG problem [BM11, CGMS17, GR16, GJ18] has used the following definition, which only guarantees that the agreed-
